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Abstract
Will the rise of China, an authoritarian, party-state with a poor record of protecting its
citizens’ human rights, undermine humanitarian intervention? This question has been
particularly pertinent since China’s “assertive turn” in foreign policy. Drawing on the
case of Chinese reactions to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, this article argues that
China’s attitude toward humanitarian intervention remains ambiguous and contradic-
tory. While China has at times prevented the UN Security Council from threatening
sanctions on Syria, it has not necessarily denied that a humanitarian crisis exists. The
article shows that the People’s Republic of China is beginning to act more as a norm
maker than norm taker, and is offering its own vision of humanitarian intervention,
coined as “responsible protection.”
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1 Introduction
Humanitarian intervention aims specifically at preventing mass killings, geno-
cide, population expulsion, or the use of child soldiers.1 The principles of
humanitarian intervention were legitimized as Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
by all Member States of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit. When
a state that is not protecting its own citizens against the most egregious and
violent crimes—such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
ethnic cleansing—states or multilateral organizations should intervene mili-
tarily with the support of the United Nations. Humanitarianism and R2P have
been controversial issues in the literature and in the international community.2
The point of contention often revolves around the moral dilemma between
respecting the right of political communities to decide on their own political
life (as epitomized by the sovereignty norm) and whether or not humanitari-
anism should drive the policies of humankind, even if this means that certain
polities’ right to autonomy must be suspended.
In cases where certain norms such as sovereignty or humanitarianism/
human protection are contested, which norm eventually “wins” is partly to do
with the persuasiveness of the argument,3 but it is also an undeniable fact that
the global power balance is often influential in making some norms “matter”
or more prevalent. It is no coincidence that liberal norms were considered the
only game in town following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ending of
the Cold War, and the subsequent period of US unipolarity. But this power
dynamicmaybe changing.ThePeople’s RepublicChina (PRC),whichhas tradi-
tionally jealously guarded its sovereignty and expressed deepmisgivings about
the moral justifications of intervention,4 is touted to become the next chal-
lenger to the hegemony of the United States, and that of Western dominance
more broadly.5 In recent years, it has increasingly sought to position itself as
a norm maker rather than a passive norm taker. What are the implications of
China’s rise for the future of humanitarian intervention? Given that changes in
the global power balance can have a profound effect on the normative fabric
of the international community, it seems important to explore this empirical
question.
1 Jones 1995.
2 Finnemore 2004; Moravcova 2014; Paris 2014; Crossley 2018; Grover 2018.
3 See Risse 2000.
4 For a classic statement on this, see Kim 1979, 414–415. For a broader overview, see Carlson
2005, 30–33. A good statement of the PRC’s stance toward sovereignty and R2P is available in
Luo 2014.
5 Layne 2012.
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This article thus aims to make a contribution to this question by examin-
ing China’s recent actions regarding UN decisions on the war in Syria from
2011 to 2018. This relatively long period allows us to analyze how an actor is
influenced by different norms when it makes decisions at the United Nations.
China’s opposition to UN resolutions has led to widespread condemnation by
Western leaders. Behind this is anunderlying fear that Beijingmayuse its newly
found political power to undermine humanitarian norms in the international
community. In 2012, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton called the UN Secu-
rity Council veto a “travesty.”6 In 2016, the British permanent representative to
the UN, Matthew Rycroft, was particularly damning of China. He stated that it
had “chosen to side with a party to the conflict which was aiding a despot who
would allow his country to be reduced to rubble.”7 In 2017, US ambassador to
the UN, Nikki Haley, said, “Russia and China made an outrageous and indefen-
sible choice today. They refused to hold [Syrian president] Bashar Al-Assad’s
regime accountable for the use of chemical weapons … They put their friends
in the Al-Assad regime ahead of our global security.” And Rycroft added, “They
have undermined the credibility of the Security Council and of the interna-
tional rules preventing the use of these barbaric weapons.”8
Yet China’s position on Syria has been far more ambiguous than what these
critics claim. China seems to have changed its position on Syria at the Security
Council between 2011 and 2018.While itmayhave startedbybeing a vetopower,
it has since oscillated between concerns for Syrian sovereignty and taking a
more responsible position on Syria. So, how, and especially why, has the PRC’s
position on humanitarian intervention evolved? Has it, as some critics have
alleged, returned to its default “conservative” position of defending sovereignty
on Syria?What are the implications for the future of intervention?
In this article, we draw broadly on constructivist insights on international
relations, and take the view that a state’s identity informs its interests. The
article proceeds as follows to shed some light to these questions. First, draw-
ing on China’s past behavior in cases where humanitarian intervention took
place, we show how China’s evolving views on sovereignty, and its desire to
have a voice in the international community throughnormmaking have condi-
tioned its cautious support for humanitarian intervention.We argue that since
themid-1990s, China’s attitude toward humanitarian intervention has become
ambiguous and contradictory. There remains a certain degree of ambivalence,
particularly when the PRC’s sovereign integrity is at stake. Yet Beijing’s stance
6 Abramovitch 2012.
7 UN 2016a.
8 “Syria Crisis: Hillary Clinton Calls UN Veto ‘Travesty’ ” 2012; UN 2016b, at 6; UN 2017a, 4, 5.
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on diplomacy and intervention no longer depends exclusively on the concept
of sovereignty, but takes into account concerns for humanitarian catastrophes.
Second,we aim to show thatwhile China has at times prevented the Security
Council from threatening sanctions on Syria, it has not necessarily denied that
a humanitarian crisis exists, and that thiswas a legitimate concern for the inter-
national community.Third,we show that beyond conventional understandings
of China’s ambiguous positions at the UN, China is beginning to act more as a
norm maker than norm taker. Instead of taking as given the interpretation of
R2P by Western actors, China is offering its own vision of humanitarian inter-
vention; that is, “responsible protection.” China concentrates, within the UN
framework, on mediation and being cautious facing the difficult situation in
Syria, on the importance of protecting people, especially against the use of
chemical weapons, and on the reconstruction of the Syrian political system
and economy. The PRC remains sensitive to global humanitarian norms, and
has actually acted more in favor of humanitarian intervention than its critics
may claim.
2 Creating the Conditions for China’s Cautious Support
for Humanitarian Intervention
2.1 Sovereignty, an Evolving Concept
China has often been considered a staunch defender of the nonintervention
norm. The reasons for this are partly ideological. China’s own experiences of
Western and Japanese imperialism mean that it has been uncomfortable with
intervention that is led by the West. As Samuel S. Kim observed, “The ‘protec-
tive’ thinking enveloped in the Chinese obsession with sovereignty reflects a
measure of the immense weight of past grievances.”9 China has also developed
a keen sense of smell for hypocrisy—and there are admittedly many cases of
this—where theWest blatantly fails to intervene in nondemocratic states with
pro-Western leaders.10 The Chinese government has thus frequently expressed
suspicion that R2P could be used by the West cynically as a fig leaf for over-
throwing regimes that the latter does not like, and has been reluctant to make
any direct contributions to intervention that lacks UN authorization. Writing
in 1993, Liu Wenzong was adamant in his view that “using human rights to
deny sovereignty is something that one can never accept.”11 Twenty-one years
9 Kim 1979, 414. Also see Gong 1984; Suzuki 2009.
10 Ruan 2012.
11 W. Liu 1993, 38.
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later, Luo Yanhua was also repeating that “China is opposed to Western argu-
ments that ‘human rights trump sovereignty.’ ”12 It is therefore no wonder that
“the claim that China’s position on sovereignty has been relatively static and
unyielding … has become so widely accepted that it passes for conventional
wisdom.”13
However, China’s views on sovereignty and nonintervention have not been
static, even though this is not to deny the strong attachment to traditional inter-
pretations of sovereignty. One key turning point for the PRC’s interpretation of
sovereignty was China’s policy of “reform and opening up” which began in the
1980s and aimed at boosting economic growth through integrating China with
the global economy. This policy resulted in China’s gradual participation in a
growing number of international regimes, which often entailed China’s partial
surrender of its sovereign prerogatives to outside forces (China’s joining of the
World Trade Organization, which restricts Beijing’s ability to freely formulate
its trade and tariff policies, is a case in point). These changes have been hugely
beneficial for China’s development, rather than being detrimental. As a result,
Beijing no longer subscribes to the view that absolute sovereignty is needed to
protect Chinese national interests.14
China’s increased integration into the international community has also
resulted in a greater interaction with the global human rights regime. Since
the mid-1990s, the need to the counter “China threat” thesis in theWest, com-
bined by a greater desire to be seen as a great power has prompted China to
play—or at least be seen to be playing—apart inmaintaining global peace and
order.15 While its own human rights record leaves much to be desired, it has to
a certain degree internalized the importance of human rights norms.16 As a
consequence, Beijing no longer contests fully the notion that certain human
rights issues are a legitimate concern for the global community, rather than an
exclusively domestic matter.
This shifting stance was visible as early as 1991, when Beijing published its
first White Paper on human rights. The Preface noted, “The issue of human
rights has become one of great significance and common concern in the world
community.”17 A considerable number of Chinese analysts now agree that
sovereignty is an evolving concept, and that contemporary sovereignty “should
12 Luo 2014, 19.
13 Carlson 2005, 30. See also Ogden 1977 Kim 1979.
14 Carlson 2005.
15 Carlson 2004; Ross and Zhu 2015.
16 See Kent 1999; Zhang 1998.
17 “Preface” 1991.
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be linked with human rights, as well as multifaceted factors that include polit-
ical, economic and social security.”18 This growing flexibility is one of the key
reasons for Beijing’s acquiescence to R2P, which some Chinese analysts believe
is a concept that “could be used to bridge the divide between supporters
of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and supporters of state sovereignty and non-
intervention.”19 China, for sure, did voice its concern that “so-called humani-
tarian justifications are applied inconsistently and used as window dressing to
justify illegitimate interference” to the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty.20 The Chinese thus insisted that authorization to
use force for “humanitarian” reasons had to be given by the Security Council,
and that consent from the host state was crucial. Yet at the 2005 World Sum-
mit, it “did little to obstruct the Summit’s endorsement of RtoP [R2P], under
the proviso that it would affirm the authority of the UN Security Council and
refrain from including criteria or guidelines for military action.”21
Beijing’s shifting stance is also apparent from its security policies, and these
changes broadly reflect its gradual acceptance that sovereignty is not abso-
lute, as well as its growing desire to counter its negative image as a threat
to global order, both of which took place in the early and mid-1990s.22 Even
before states accepted the concept of R2P at the UN World Summit in 2005,
China’s change was visible. During NATO’s Kosovo campaign in 1999, the Chi-
nese argued that the “settlement of theKosovo issue should be based on respect
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,”
and such critical voices became prominent in the context of the NATO bomb-
ing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.23 However, in the same it year, “Beijing
played a quiet, supportive role in facilitating humanitarian intervention in East
Timor.”24 It agreed to Security Council Resolutions 1264 and 1272, which autho-
rized the deployment of multinational forces to restore peace in East Timor,
and established a UN Transitional Administration in East Timor.
Since then, the PRC has broadly continued its policy of cautious support
of intervention. While continuing to pay rhetorical lip service to the princi-
ple that the host state’s consent is always required prior to intervention, it has
18 Y.Wang 2001, 144. See also Carlson 2006 and Davis 2011.
19 Pang Zhongying, as quoted in Foot andWalter 2011, 60.
20 Teitt 2011, 300. Such concerns can be found in Zhu 2001.
21 Teitt 2011, 303.
22 Carlson 2005.
23 Remarks made by Qin Huasun, China’s representative to the UN, emphasis added. See
UN 1999, 12.
24 Carlson 2005, 176.
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allowed itself some political space for maneuver.While Beijing has not yet par-
ticipated in any military interventions, it has become a key contributor to UN
Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO).25 China’s behavior with regard to policies
toward several conflicts has changed. The PRC abstained from or agreed with
the use of Chapter VII in the cases of Somalia, the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan,
East Timor, Sierra Leone, Côte d’ Ivoire, Sudan, Libya, Central African Republic,
and Mali.26
In the case of Sudan, China played an important role in obtaining Presi-
dent Omar al-Bashir’s somewhat reluctant “consent” for accepting the UN–
African Union peacekeepingmission.27 It did not veto Resolution 1706 in 2006,
whereby the UN peacekeeping operation would be deployed in Darfur to pro-
tect civilians under a Chapter VII mandate. This is an indication that China
doesnot insist ona strict,morenormative/political definitionof consent, which
must be given under perfect conditions of freedom. Rather, Beijing’s stance on
this issue is a more legalistic one, in that intervention can be justified as long
as the host state has—regardless of its actual preferences—given its “permis-
sion” on paper. Whether or not this was given under conditions of pressure or
coercion is a matter of secondary concern.
These changes in Beijing’s behavior are again difficult to explain without
reference to normative factors. China’s close relations with Khartoum were
coming under increasing criticism by 2006.28 The fact that China found itself
unable to veto Resolution 1706—despite China’s strategic interests in Sudanese
oil and the risk of incurring the Sudanese government’s displeasure—is a
strong indication that Beijing recognized that there did exist a humanitarian
crisis in Sudan, as well as its awareness that being seen as opposing efforts to
save human lives was likely to earn it a negative international reputation.29 It is
worth noting that attempts at “shaming” can be successful only if the party that
is “shamed” shares similar notions of what behavior ismorally or socially “unac-
ceptable.”The fact thatChinabalked at the idea of being shamed for sidingwith
regimes that harmed their own citizens is evidence of its gradual internaliza-
tion of certain human rights norms. Its refusal to use its veto also “suggests that
many Chinese elites have now come to accept the general legitimacy of multi-
lateral intervention to resolve particularly prominent humanitarian crises.”30
25 Hirono and Lanteigne 2011.
26 Gegout 2018.
27 Brautigam 2009, 282–283.
28 “China Envoy Defends Africa Policy” 2006.
29 A similar point has been made with reference to the intervention in Libya and the adop-
tion of UN Security Council Resolution 1970 in 2011. See Bellamy andWilliams 2011, 844.
30 Carlson 2004, 24.
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Even in the case of Libya—nowadays cited as an event that made the Chi-
nese take a more hard-line attitude toward the West with regard to the Syrian
civil war—Beijing’s initial position was not necessarily characterized by oppo-
sition.31 China did not want to be made a scapegoat (beiheiguo) for potential
inaction, and risk a loss to its international reputation.32This is again testimony
to the fact that Beijing is acutely aware of human rights norms and its links to
international legitimacy, and is not necessarily going to sacrifice civilian lives
on the ideological altar of sovereignty.
2.2 NormMaking in Humanitarian Intervention: “Responsible
Protection”
Interestingly, this partial acceptance of humanitarian intervention has contin-
ued despite China’s alleged “assertive turn” since the start of the 2010s. While
muchof the recent discussions onChina’s “assertiveness” have concentratedon
the territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea, another aspect of this
development is China’s attempts to become a normmaker rather than a norm
taker. This policy is linked to the PRC’s desire to have its voice in global gover-
nance heardmore in away that is commensurate with its newly found political
power. Since China found itself facing global condemnation after the Tianan-
men Massacre in 1989, its main foreign policy strategy has been “taoguang
yanghui,” which was essentially concerned with keeping a low profile and not
seeking leadership. However, this famous sentence is incomplete; in full, it is
“taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei,” which can be translated as “keeping a low
profile, but trying nevertheless to accomplish something.” Since the beginning
of the 2010s, Beijing’s emphasis has arguably shifted gradually to yousuozuowei,
and there have been increasing debates about how China can (and should)
use its newly found influence in the international community. One of the best
known of these attempts is, of course, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank
and the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to increase China’s economic and
political influence within Asia, and more broadly the world.33
It is arguable that the Chinese have also begun to do this in the area of
humanitarian intervention, which has been named “responsible protection”34
31 “China’s Stake in Syria Stand-Off” 2012.
32 Interview, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing, 1 November 2011.
33 A useful discussion on this topic can be found in H.Wang 2014.
34 “Responsible protection” has been forwarded by Ruan Zongze, who is a well-known ana-
lyst at the Chinese Institute of International Studies, a think tank affiliated with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the close relation the institute enjoys with the polit-
ical decisionmakers, as well as the political costs of departing from political orthodoxy
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This concept consists of six pillars. First, the object of protection must be “the
people of the target country and peace and stability of the relevant region
… not specific political parties or armed forces.” Second, the Security Council
should be the “only legitimate actor to perform” the duty of protection. Third,
intervention should be the last resort, and non-military means should prevail
as they “produce long-lasting results with lesser side effects.” Fourth, protec-
tion should not create “greater humanitarian disasters” or be used for regime
change. Fifth, the ‘protectors’ “should be responsible for the post-‘intervention’
and post-‘protection’ reconstruction of the state concerned.” Finally, the UN
should “establish mechanisms of supervision, outcome evaluation and post
fact accountability to ensure the means, process, scope and results of ‘pro-
tection.’ ”35 In some respects, the proposals for responsible protection reflect
long-standing Chinese principles, such as the need for Council legitimation
andCouncil-backed operations to be the sole “legitimate” force for intervening.
This is of course nothing new, and stem from China’s long-standing suspicion
of the possibility that R2P could be abused by powerful states to implement
regime change, as well as its commitment toward the norm of sovereignty. It
is also indicative of Beijing’s ongoing reluctance to fully commit itself to the
causes of the great powers—in practice, theWestern powers.
However, it would be premature to dismiss the concept of responsible pro-
tection as part of “a broader effort to remake the rules of the international
system or perhaps free itself from their constraints.”36 The concept does not
necessarily deny the use of force—it merely states it should be the last resort.
This is again indicative that the Chinese political elite recognizes that certain
humanitarian catastrophes couldmeritmilitary intervention. This line has also
been repeated by the Chinese diplomat who stated in 2013 that R2P should be
adopted on the basis of case-by-case analysis.37 In addition, it is important to
note that other aspects of responsible protection are partly echoed by non-
Chinese analysts as well. This makes it more difficult to dismiss this concept
asmerely a Chinese smokescreen to undermine intervention, as epitomized by
R2P. With regard to a preference for diplomacy rather than military interven-
in a party-state like the PRC (particularly since the Xi Jinping era), Ruan’s views can be
assumed to be ideas that have been articulated among elite circles. Furthermore, the fact
that this article has been disseminated for an international audience in English is also
indicative of Beijing’s desire to demonstrate its readiness to act as a responsible great
power.
35 Ruan 2012.
36 Swaine 2010, 3.
37 T. Liu and Zhang 2014, 420.
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tion to reduce the number of casualties,38 Alex Bellamy takes a similar stand
to the Chinese position, as he argues that R2P should be used only as a last
resort, and actors should focus on preventive diplomacy.39 It is also notewor-
thy that the call for “postprotection” responsibility bears conspicuous similarity
to the doctrine of “responsibility to rebuild,” meaning that interveners in R2P
situations should make “a genuine commitment to helping to build a durable
peace, and promoting good governance and sustainable development,” which
was originally introduced into the R2P concept by the International Commis-
sion on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001.40
If we are to accept that China’s simultaneous commitment to the princi-
ple of sovereignty and growing awareness that humanitarian catastrophesmay
justify intervention in some cases has—despite its growing “assertiveness”—
continued to this day, then it is worth examining how this hasmanifested itself
in recent controversies around humanitarian crises. To this end, we now turn
to the Syrian case.
3 China on Syria: Navigating the Tension between Sovereignty
and Humanitarian Concerns
China’s recent stance in Syria shows an ambiguous commitment to humanitar-
ian intervention (see Table 1). In 2011, China (with Russia) vetoed a draft reso-
lution that would have threatened sanctions, emphasizing that Syria’s sover-
eignty needed to be respected.41 Beijing continued to invoke sovereignty in
2012. In February 2012, Beijing joinedMoscow in vetoing a draft resolution that
called on both sides of the conflict to end violence. Crucially, this veto was
cast despite the fact that the resolution did not authorize any form of inter-
national intervention. Li Baodong, the representative of the PRC, stated that
while the “international community should provide ‘constructive assistance’ ”
to end the violence in Syria, “the country’s sovereignty, independence and ter-
ritorial integrity must be respected.”42 Between December 2016 and February
2017, China adopted a conservative line on Syria again. Even though China sup-
ported access to civilians for humanitarian assistance (Resolutions 2328 and
2332), and international efforts for negotiations (Resolution 2336), it followed
38 Garwood-Gowers 2013; T. Liu and Zhang 2014.
39 Bellamy 2011.
40 Paris 2014, 577.
41 UN 2011.
42 UN 2012.
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table 1 China’s voting pattern in UN resolutions concerning Syriaa
Date and
resolution
Aim of the resolution China’s
position
China respects
humanitarian
principles
Draft resolution or
resolution infringes
on sovereignty
2011, Draft
Resolution
S/2011/612
Threaten sanctions Veto (with
Russia)
No No
Early 2012,
Draft Resolu-
tion S/2012/77
Ask for end of violence Veto (with
Russia)
No No
Late 2012, Draft
Resolution
S/2012/538
Threaten sanctions (with a
mention of Chapter VII)
Veto (with
Russia)
No No (but possible
in the long term,
as Chapter VII is
mentioned)
2013, Resolu-
tion 2118
Ensure the elimination of the
Syrian chemical weapons pro-
gram
Unanimous
support
Yes Resolution states
it is committed to
sovereignty
2014, (three)
Resolutions
2139, 2165, 2191
Deliver humanitarian support Unanimous
support
Yes No
2014, Draft
Resolution
S/2014/348
Refer Syria to the International
Criminal Court (with a mention
of Chapter VII)
Veto (with
Russia)
No Yes
2015, (four) Res-
olutions 2209,
2235, 2254, 2258
Require the prohibition of chlo-
rine gas;
Unanimous
support
Yes Nob
create the Joint Investigative
Mechanism for investigating
the use of chemical weapons;
Yes No
ask for a Road Map for Peace; Yes No
ask for cross-border aid delivery Yes No
2016, Draft
Resolution
S/2016/846
Urge for cessation of hostilities,
and end of bombardments over
Aleppo
Abstention
(whereas Rus-
sia vetoed)
Yes Yes (acknowledged
by China)
2016, Draft
Resolution
S/2016/1026
End the attack of Aleppo Veto (with
Russia)
Yes Yes
2016–2017,
(seven) Resolu-
tions 2268, 2314,
2319, 2328, 2332,
2336 (2016),
2393 (2017)
Allow access to civilians for
humanitarian assistance;
Unanimous
support
Yes No
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Table 1 China’s voting pattern in UN resolutions concerning Syriaa (cont.)
Date and
resolution
Aim of the resolution China’s
position
China respects
humanitarian
principles
Draft resolution or
resolution infringes
on sovereignty
call for an international effort
(political talks, and UN access
to Aleppo)
Yes No
2017, Draft
Resolution
S/2017/172
Condemn the use of chemical
weapons (with a mention of
Chapter VII)
Veto (with
Russia)
No Yes
2017, Draft
Resolution
S/2017/884
Prolong/renewmandate of
international body on the use
of chemical weapons
Abstention
(whereas Rus-
sia vetoed)
Yes No
2017 and 2018,
Draft Resolu-
tions S/2017/315
and S/2018/321
Condemn the use of chemical
weapons, and ask for account-
ability for criminals
Abstention
(whereas Rus-
sia vetoed)
Yes No
2018, Resolu-
tions 2401 and
2449
Ask for humanitarian access; Unanimous
support
Yes No
ask for a cessation of hostilities Yes No
Notes:
a. The discussion of UN Security Council resolutions does not include those on the creation of UN Super-
vision Mission in Syria, which suspended its activities in 2012, and on the condemnation of terrorism, as
these do not infringe on the concept of sovereignty.
b. Syria became a party to the ChemicalWeapons Convention in the fall of 2013.
Russia againwhen it vetoed a resolution thatwould have had all parties in Syria
end attacks on the city of Aleppo within twenty-four hours for a duration of at
least one week.
China’s frequent invokingof the sovereigntynorm, coupledwith its allegedly
more “assertive” foreign policy in recent years, seems to have prompted ana-
lysts to resurrect the “conventional wisdom” that the PRC has always been the
staunchest guardian of the sovereignty norm, and is happy to sacrifice human-
itarian concerns for national interests.43 A typical example of this is a British
journalist’s claim that “China’s diplomacy is not at all about principles and pro-
tecting civilians in a far-off nation, but about hard-headed self interest,” even
though “civilians are continuing to die in Syria in their dozens.”44
43 Swaine 2010, 3.
44 “China’s Stake in the Syria Stand-Off” 2012.
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These arguments, however, run into problems when faced with the voting
patterns of Beijing regarding Syria, which are best depicted as indeterminate,
with agreements and abstentions.45 For a start, the Chinese have not been in
a state of denial, and insisted that the civil war is purely a domestic issue for
the Syrians to solve themselves. As one Chinese analyst noted, the “military
conflicts in Syria have caused significant civilian casualties, a fact that should
attract the attention of the international community.”46 In 2013, China also sup-
ported Security Council Resolution 2118 on Syria, which aimed to secure and
destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi
did not mention the issue of sovereignty. Instead, he stated, “[The Council]
must maintain a sense of responsibility towards the Syrian people and to world
history and ensure that any decision it takes is able to pass the test of history.”47
He referred to China’s own experience of chemical weapons duringWorldWar
II. In 2015, despite Wang Yi’s statement that “Syria’s future must be decided by
Syrians, consistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter and inter-
national law,”48 China agreedwith other SecurityCouncilmembers that theuse
of chlorine gas should be prohibited, and amechanism of investigation should
be created (Resolutions 2209 and 2235).
In 2016, China abstained while Russia vetoed Security Council Draft Resolu-
tion 846. The Chinese representative to the UN, Liu Jieyi, said the international
community had to “keep its focus on achieving a political solution through dia-
logue,” and “the Security Council should help improve the situation, help push
for a cessation of hostilities.” But he also acknowledged that the resolution did
“not reflect full respect for Syria’s sovereignty and independence.”49
In February 2017, the PRC blocked a Security Council resolution that would
have sanctioned Syria for using chemical weapons against its citizens. This was
to be a temporary veto on the issue of chemical weapons. China said that inves-
tigations on chemical weapon were still ongoing, so the resolution was too
early, and that “every Council member bears the sacred responsibility of main-
taining international peace and security.”50 Yet twomonths later, it changed its
position again: it abstained, but condemned the reported chemical weapons
attack on the Syrian town of Khan Shaykhun, and wanted to hold the perpe-
45 Fung 2018.
46 Qu 2012, 17, emphasis added.
47 UN 2013, 9, emphasis added.
48 Tiezzi 2015.
49 UN 2016a.
50 UN 2017a, 10.
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trators accountable.51 In April 2018, China abstained again when a resolution
would have condemned the use of chemical weapons. It reiterated the impor-
tance of sovereignty, but also the importance of negotiations and of the prohi-
bition of the use of chemical weapons.52
4 Understanding China’s Evolving Politics in Syria: Ambiguity,
with a Growing Support for Responsible Protection
4.1 The Limits of Conventional Understanding
China’s voting behavior in theUNwith regard to Syria defies simplistic general-
izations. Someanalysts have argued that “China alongwithRussia, both author-
itarian states themselves, are concerned about theway repressive regimes have
been falling in the Arab Spring.”53 This argument essentially states that China
is opposing humanitarian intervention because it somehow feels a sense of
“authoritarian solidarity” and fears regime change. This claim is problematic.
Beijing may fear regime change within its own borders, but as long as China’s
own national interests (regime/state survival and economic growth) are not
affected, it has not actively sought to prop up other authoritarian rulers for
the sake of an ideological commitment to undemocratic rule. Indeed, China
has seen a number of authoritarian states democratize in recent years (exam-
ples include Indonesia), but it has not necessarily tried to block this process.
Instead, China has tended to watch from the sidelines.
Other researchers have said that China could be wary of Islamism to pro-
tect its security. Beijing fears that radical Islamism “could end up spreading …
to China’s own Muslim populations in Xinjiang.”54 With the PRC’s oppressive
policies toward its Muslimminority (such as the incarceration of Muslims and
forced “Sinicization”) in Xinjiang recently placed under the spotlight, the Chi-
nese government could fear a potential backlash from radical Islamic groups
within its borders. While fears of radical Islamic militants infiltrating China is
certainly a possibility, it is debatable as to whether or not this is “enough to
shape its whole policy towards Syria.”55
51 UN 2017b.
52 UN 2018.
53 “China’s Stake in the Syria Stand-Off” 2012. On cooperation among authoritarian regimes,
see Schoen and Kaylan 2014; von Soest 2015.
54 “China’s Stake in the Syria Stand-Off” 2012.
55 “China’s Stake in the Syria Stand-Off” 2012.
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It is possible that pragmatic concerns motivate the Chinese leadership. A
likely interest for China in 2017 was to show “its goodwill and willingness to
work with the US on global issues.”56 This is consistent with the PRC’s goal of
gaining acceptance as a responsible great power and countering the various
“China threat” theses, which have been ongoing since the late 1990s. China does
nothave economic andpolitical interests in Syria like it did inLibya.AsoneChi-
nese scholar notes, in 2010 Syria accounted “for only 0.08% of China’s overall
trade,” and was worth ameager $2.48 billion.57 However, China has strong eco-
nomic interests in the Middle East. It needs to keep good relations with Syria’s
neighbors, and over 44 percent of Chinese imports of oil came from theMiddle
East in 2018.58 As early as November 2017, China has wanted to include Syria in
its Belt Road Initiative.59 In 2018, Xi Jinping pledged that China would provide
$20 billion in loans to help Arab states in economic reconstruction.60
4.2 China’s Contribution to Humanitarianism through Responsible
Protection
More importantly, however, China’s indeterminacy in the Syria crisis also
reflects its gradual acceptance of humanitarianism driving UN polices. On
the one hand, the PRC has continued to demonstrate elements of conser-
vatism with regard to upholding the sovereignty norm. In 2012, 2014, and 2017,
China vetoed all Security Council resolutions that referred to R2P through
Chapter VII.61 On the other hand, the PRC’s voting patterns in 2013 and 2017–
2018 were indicative of the fact that there were moral limitations for Beijing’s
defense of sovereignty. The fact that the PRC went along with resolutions that
called for the restrictions of Syria’s use of chemical weapons shows its aware-
ness of this normative constraint and sensitivity to be seen as a responsible
actor within international society.62 It did not consider the Bashar al-Assad
regime’s use of chemical weapons in a civil war as a domestic issue, where
sovereignty needed to be upheld.
China’s repeated statements that the humanitarian crisis in Syria was amat-
ter of international concern suggests that the latter was an important part
of Beijing’s reasoning. China’s UN representative, Li Baodong, did not deny
56 Wong 2017.
57 Qu 2012, 15.
58 Calculated from BP 2018, 24.
59 Gao 2017.
60 “Highlights of Xi’s Speech at China-Arab Forum” 2018.
61 Luck 2009.
62 Price 1997.
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the existence of a humanitarian problem, and neither did his invoking of the
sovereignty normmean that the international community should leave the Syr-
ians to sort out their civil war by themselves.63 Crucially, China’s disquiet over
the efficacy of intervention was not entirely out of sync with other Western
powers, despite their condemnation of China’s behavior. Both US and British
military personnel are reported to have expressed their concerns about inter-
vention, stating the “potential for killing vast numbers of civilians andplunging
the country closer to civil war.”64
Some Chinese principles as articulated in the responsible protection con-
cept could also have influenced some of Beijing’s voting behavior. For instance,
the PRC’s caution toward regime change may, on the surface, look like a more
conservative concern that fears that theWestmay abuse its power to overthrow
any anti-Western government. Yet this could also be interpreted as the Chi-
nese following their principle in the responsible protection that the “purpose
of ‘protection must be defined,’ ” and not go beyond its mandate of what it was
supposed to protect in the first place. There are some real justifications for this
concern. Humanitarian intervention or R2P is vulnerable to abuse, as powerful
states with access to sufficient military and other material resources can inter-
vene when and where they choose.65
However, this does not mean a rigid adherence to nonintervention. As Qu
Xing of the China Institute of International Studies notes, if regime change
takes place in amultilateral setting, rather than because of hegemonic interests
(in practice,Western interests), the PRCmay not always stand in the way. This
again highlights the need to exercise caution in dismissing Beijing’s motives as
being concerned solely with challenging theWestern-dominated international
order, or eroding humanitarian interventionnorms. AsQunoteswith reference
to Syria:
If the LAS [League of Arab States] can reach an agreement with all par-
ties concerned in Syria so that Bashar will transfer power … China would
have no difficulty endorsing such a decision since China welcomes any
political arrangement supported by all sides in Syria.66
With regard to the PRC’s claim that responsible protection should take into
account thepossibility that intervention couldbring greater casualties, this line
63 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 2012.
64 US and British military personnel, as quoted in Paris 2014, 587.
65 Gegout 2018, 32.
66 Qu 2012, 19.
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was visible in some of its urging caution against intervention. However, China’s
repeated statements that the humanitarian crisis in Syria was amatter of inter-
national concern suggests that the latter was also an important part of Beijing’s
reasoning. China’s UN representative from 2010 to 2013, Li Baodong, did not
deny the existence of a humanitarian problem, and neither did his invoking
of the sovereignty norm mean that the international community should leave
the Syrians to sort out their civil war by themselves.67 Crucially, China’s dis-
quiet over the efficacy of intervention was not entirely out of sync with other
Western powers, despite their condemnation of China’s behavior.68
Chinese concerns about responsible “postprotection” are also a strong pos-
sibility that motivated their cautious attitude toward intervening in Syria. Chi-
nese analysts have takennoteof the sectarian violence that erupted in Iraq after
the US-led invasion, and have (with some justification) questioned whether
this belief in the imposition of a “single model” of governance is the only way
to bring peace and solve internal conflict—even though they may ultimately
support it if such policies bring results.69
Overall, despite the claims that China has become more “assertive”—in-
cluding in its support of the sovereignty norm—whatwe are seeing fromChina
is a continuation of the same policies with regard to intervention.70 Defend-
ing “China’s sovereignty” does remain “a paramount concern” and is likely to
be opposed.71 Yet despite its boastful claims of China’s rise, the PRC simultane-
ously remains sensitive to its international reputation.72A flagrant disregard for
humanitarian concerns would considerably damage the PRC’s international
image, and pose a setback for Beijing’s quest to construct an identity of a
responsible great power in the international system.73
5 Conclusion
China’s engagementwithhumanitarian intervention/R2P is a complexone that
does not necessarily reveal a consistent strategy on the part of Beijing. The
67 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 2012.
68 Paris 2014, 587.
69 Interview, China Foundation for International Strategic Studies, Beijing, 23 April 2007.
70 Whether or notChina’s overall foreignpolicy has actually become “assertive” is a contested
issue, however. For a critical discussion, see Swaine 2010; Johnston 2013; Jerdén 2014; Roy
2019.
71 Carlson 2005, 176.
72 See, for instance, Guo 2004; Yan 2006.
73 He and Feng 2012.
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Chinese have displayed a strong sense of disquiet toward the debates of inter-
national intervention in the case of Syria, which has unfortunately resulted in
deadlock at the Security Council and further civilian deaths in the country. It
seems, however, that too many Western politicians have been quick to point
the finger of blame at the PRC, and denounce the latter for its lack of a sense
of responsibility. To an extent, Beijing’s own ambiguity has not helpedmatters.
As an authoritarian party state with a dismal record of protecting its own citi-
zens’ human rights, it is easy—if not analytically complacent—to extrapolate
from China’s domestic political situation and claim that the PRC is indifferent
to global humanitarian crises.
China’s actual behavior has been more complex, however. In the case of
Syria, China’s stance can be seen to be related to important questions of what
policies should be adopted by the international community to solve a human-
itarian crisis,74 rather than simply opposing the West to prove its “assertive-
ness.” The Chinese have not necessarily merely offered critiques of the current
arrangements, but also have suggested a number of proposals to overcome
these shortcomings. Far from overturning humanitarian intervention, China
has provided some support to humanitarian policies in Syria. The 2016 Draft
Resolution 846was themost unexpected one, as it could have infringed on Syr-
ian sovereignty. AlthoughChinaonce vetoed a resolutionon the condemnation
of the use of chemical weapons (but this resolution made a direct reference
to Chapter VII), it did not veto any other resolution of the same type. Since
2011, China has offered its own vision of R2P: responsible protection. It has
acknowledged the humanitarian necessity of addressing the conflict in Syria,
and wants to focus on political dialogue. In early 2016, China invited the Syr-
ian government and the opposition to Beijing for discussions. In March 2016,
China appointed its first special envoy for Syria, Xie Xiaoyan. In August 2016,
China said it would provide personnel training and humanitarian aid to Syrian
president al-Assad. By doing so, it is showing its capacity of being a diplomatic
actor in the Syrian crisis, and in the wider Middle East (with growing ties with
Iran and Saudi Arabia), at a time when it is also showing its presence on the
African continent.
Overall, thismeans that radical changes in current arrangements for human-
itarian intervention are unlikely to be fundamentally undermined as China’s
rise to power continues. Ultimately, we need to remind ourselves that ambigu-
ous, contradictory behavior is often “the stuff of politics.” Beijing remains some-
74 This point was raised to one of the authors during the China Foundation for International
Strategic Studies interview.
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what torn between its suspicions of intervention and the hegemonic power of
theWest (in particular, theUnited States) and its desire tomove beyond a norm
taker while simultaneously upholding its image as a responsible power. Unless
its own sovereign prerogatives are at stake, it cannot afford to be completely
indifferent to global norms that have been built up over the years and construct
an alternative international order.
Beijing will continue to harbor its suspicions toward Western hegemonic
ambitions, but it is not likely to oppose all cases of humanitarian intervention
on principle. While it is true that the policy of “doing something” may result
in the Chinese attempting to become norm makers in this area, what we have
seen from China so far does not constitute a radical departure from the R2P
principle. There will, of course, be confrontations between China and theWest
in the future. Humanitarian intervention is, however, a morally fraught issue
where tensions and contradictions easily arise.75 Our research suggests that
simplistic blaming of Chinese opposition to failures in Western proposals to
intervene risk misreading Chinese intentions, and could only complicate the
West’s relations with China. It could also prevent the efficacious resolving of
future humanitarian crises.
This does not meant that our research is complete. Due to the politically
opaque nature of China’s political decisionmaking structure, we have adopted
a statist approach and “blackboxed” the domestic political bargaining pro-
cess. Studies on informal politics in China indicate that “informal groups have
become increasingly oriented … to the promotion of policies designed to
enhance their bureaucratic interests.”76 This could lead one to hypothesize that
moderate attitudes toward R2P are more likely to come from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and its interest group, given that the ministry is at the forefront
of China’s diplomatic interactions, and could have an interest in promoting
China as a “responsible,” “status quo” power. Indeed, China’s increasing involve-
ment in UNPKO is attributed to the “institutional lead taken by theMinistry of
Foreign Affairs with central leadership backing.”77 One could also surmise that
critical voices are likely to come from factions closer to the Peoples’ Liberation
Army (PLA), which has been depicted as “the hypernationalistic guardian of
claimed Chinese territorial sovereignty.”78 However, Alastair Iain Johnston has
75 Paris 2014.
76 Dittmer 1995. 34.
77 Foot andWalter 2011, 58.
78 Shambaugh 1999–2000, 52. The PLA is reported to have been skeptical about participating
in UNPKO, stating that this was not a particularly important issue in which the Chinese
armed forces needed to be involved. See Foot andWalter 2011, 58.
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noted that “noone really knows theworking relationshipbetween the toppolit-
ical leadership and the PLA, as one hears different versions in Beijing.”79 In the
future, a researcher with better access to Chinese government officials could
explore howdifferent actors understand the concept of responsible protection.
Opening up the Chinese domestic blackbox would yield further fascinating
insights into our understanding of Chinese domestic and foreign policy.
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